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in the early part of the king's reign, prior to his conquest of Elam and Larsa; for in it Hammurabi calls himself simply "King of Babylon." It refers to the building of the wall of Sippar, which, doubtless, is the event celebrated in the dates of the king. From them we learn that in his twenty-third year the foundations of the wall were laid, and that they were finished in the twenty-fifth year of his reign. Hammurabi called the wall which he constructed In-Qibit-Shamash-Hammurabi-mahiri-irshi-shumshu, which means, "by the command of Shamash may Hammurabi not have any adversaries." He closes his inscription, after recording some other pious deeds, with these words: "Truly I have established my splendid name daily in the mouth of the people, to be mentioned like that of a god, who for all times will never be forgotten."

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THE ASIATIC DIONYSOS¹

The author of this book dips into the waters of Indic philology with a broad-meshed sieve and brings up—nothing. It is a pity that so much work should be wasted on such an antiquated mythological method. Her far-reaching conclusions are based on a very superficial knowledge of India. In the light of present-day knowledge it is fatuous to base a treatment of Soma on Langlois (1853) and Maury (1857). These books were written in the infancy of Vedic study and are negligible today. The bibliography at the end of the book is imposing at first glance; but no mention is made of a large number of recent books and articles which are indispensable for the author's purpose. Miss Davis prefers to move in an atmosphere of hazy generalities. She adds up a long row of zeros and expects to get a positive number as an answer. Lack of space prevents citation of counter-evidence and mention of important discussions which, apparently, are unknown to Miss Davis.

The aim of the book is to prove that the Dionysos cult of Greece was derived from the Vedic Soma cult. See p. 258:

The elaborate chants of the priests were, it may be conceived, preserved in the form of cult-epithets, and the metaphors applied by them to the Soma crystallized into the picturesque myths attached to the legend of Dionysos.

There must have been a wholesale disease of language in this "remembrance of the Soma ritual" (p. 184) and this "process of the formation

¹ *The Asiatic Dionysos*. By Gladys M. N. Davis. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914. x+276 pages. 10s. 6d.

of myth from ritual" (p. 171). Further, in order to fill out her comparisons, the author is compelled to draw upon many local cults from many different parts of Greece. If there was such wholesale and minute borrowing from a unified, hieratic Soma cult, why are the derivatives so scattered? As in the case of Çiva and Vishnu, is it not likely that many local godlings and cults were fused into the Dionysos cult? Many of the epithets on which Miss Davis bases her conclusions are not typical of Soma but are applied indiscriminately to nearly all the other Vedic gods or belong to Soma secondarily. Our author has no understanding of the aristocratic and hieratic nature of the Soma cult; no knowledge of the symbolic, metaphorical, and hieratic aspect of Vedic diction; no comprehension of the part played by Soma in the Vedic ritual as a whole. For the most part Soma is not anthropomorphic; he is merely compared to the objects she mentions, is not equated with them. Even here she is not consistent, for she maintains on the one hand the origin of myth from ritual and on the other hand makes great effort to prove anthropomorphic forms of Soma corresponding to forms of Dionysos.¹

On the one hand Miss Davis presses into service every obscure Vedic epithet (such as that of the "thunderbolt," p. 40, and of the "razor's edge," p. 44, note); on the other hand she finds utter disagreement in such general and important matters as the eschatology and theories of sleep (pp. 33, 40). If the acquaintance with the Vedic ritual was so minute that epithets occurring only once could be borrowed, it is unthinkable that there should be no traces of some of the more general characteristics of the Soma ritual, that there should be such fundamental differences between the Vedic and the Greek ritual. Why did not Agni and Indra, the most important figures in the Vedic pantheon, leave as much trace as Soma? The Vedic ritual is, to be sure, a Soma ritual; but it is chiefly directed to Indra. Soma is secondary.

¹ See for instance pp. 169, 171, 172, 173, 177, 223 for untenable comparisons with Dionysos based on similes and secondary traits of Soma. All Vedic gods are more or less gods of safety, of creation, and of healing. The traits are secondary in the case of Soma (p. 195). Soma is not "largely a deity of the dead" (p. 41). The Āpas "Waters" are not special attendants of Soma or equated with the Apsarasas (p. 148). The terms *rsi*, *kavi*, etc., are applied to Agni as often as to Soma. There is nothing in the passage (p. 141) to suggest in the faintest way a prototype of "Dionysos Mel-pomenos, the God of Tragic and Musical Festivals." The comparisons of Soma to the ocean and to rain are secondary. They are based on the fact that water was mixed with the Soma and that the Soma vat was compared to an ocean. To derive Dionysos "Τηρ from Soma is absurd (p. 146). There is no real parallel between the functions of the two. Surely *su*, "to flow," from which Soma is derived, is very different from *βελν*, "to rain," applied to Dionysos.

Miss Davis alleges two currents of Indian influence on Greece (pp. 6, 134, 168, 244-46), one during the thirteenth century, the other between the eighth and the sixth centuries B.C., but without trying to locate definitely the home of the Vedic Aryans during the thirteenth century (except for the hazy generalities of pp. 135, 168) and without discriminating between the Soma ritual of the thirteenth century and that of the sixth century. She finds in Zagreus "a reference to his (Dionysos) identity with Homa the plant-god of Zagros" (p. 156), but does not try to show what connection there was between the Vedic Soma ritual and the Zagros range. Her conception of the relation of the Rig Veda to the Avesta is most naïve. See pp. 134-35 and especially p. 23: "In the absence of documents which would show the philosophical side of Zoroastrianism, we must naturally turn to these semitheological speculations of the kindred Indian race as evidence for what may have been the state of contemporary Persian metaphysics." We might as well turn to Kant and Schopenhauer for evidence of the condition of the contemporary philosophy of the kindred Russians. Why try to "imagine" (p. 26) Indian teachers in Persia at the time of Pythagoras? We must have tangible evidence if the argument is to be valid.

On pp. 63-130 a multitude of quotations from Sanskrit works ranging in date from the fourth to the twelfth centuries A.D. is adduced as proof of Indian influence on early Greek writers (the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.). Even in India, as Barth has said, the centuries have a physiognomy. No parallels can have any possible validity unless they are coeval with the Greek authors to whom the comparisons are made. What can be proved by comparing with Aeschylus passages written one thousand years later? If passages later than the fourth century B.C. are ruled out, the parallels shrink to insignificance. Even these few remaining parallels of word and thought can mean little unless backed up by definite historical evidence. For the earliest traces of an "artificial" style, see the well-known article of Bühler translated in the *Indian Antiquary* for 1913.

The only reference to the important Boghaz-keui inscriptions, which are of prime importance for the problem discussed on p. 256, is at second hand (p. 18). There is a long list of valuable articles on the subject.

There is nothing whatever in the sat and asat of the Upanishads or in the Māyā of the Vedānta to correspond to the statements made on pp. 24, 34, 38, 47, 66. There is no duality of Good and Evil in Hindu

philosophy as there is in the Avesta. Brahman is free from all evil. Mâyā is Nescience with no moral implications. The Hindu finds in karma an answer to the moral problem.

For the Upanishads only Müller and Gough are used. Both are bad guides. We can arrange the Upanishads only according to a relative chronology. Miss Davis treats them as on a flat background. The quotations from the Çvetāçvatara (pp. 38, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 59, 65), from the Muṇḍaka (pp. 33, 37, 45, 54, 64), and from the Māṇḍūkya (pp. 58, 64) are useless as parallels. These texts may date from well within the Christian era. Even the Kaṭha (pp. 31, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53) cannot be used as coeval with Plato and his predecessors.

It is now generally recognized that the Mâyā doctrine, which Miss Davis confidently refers to as found in the Upanishads (pp. 26, 42, 47, 64, 65), is of much later date. Müller, Gough, Deussen, and Çankara carry the speculations of a much later age back into the primitive Upanishads. The monistic Vedānta is not pre-Buddhistic. Miss Davis (p. 26) calls it pre-Buddhistic; but compare the contradictory statement on p. 28, note: "The Vedantic philosophy which arose about the beginning of the Christian era."

The Gītā is not a Upanishad at all (pp. 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 41, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 72, 180, 205). Hopkins has maintained erroneously that it was based on an old Upanishad. All comparisons from the Gītā (*ca.* 200 B.C. to 200 A.D.) are chronologically impossible.

Garbe's theories about the Sāṃkhya are no longer considered tenable. Miss Davis accepts them without criticism. The theory of kalpas and yugas (pp. 43, 52, 53, 62, 73) is first found in the Epic (400 B.C. to 400 A.D.). There is no evidence that it is as old as Anaximander. The Puranic cosmology (p. 63) cannot be adduced as a parallel. None of the Purāṇas can be dated earlier than the third century A.D. There is not a shred of evidence that the Jain cosmology (pp. 47-48) is as old as Plato. Surely references should be given to the standard articles which treat this much disputed problem.

The note on Buddhism (p. 30) is grossly misleading. Whatever Buddha himself believed about the soul and about Nirvāṇa he did not himself preach a doctrine of annihilation. The çūnyavāda is much later.

The fallacy of arguments based on the flimsy generalities quoted below is too patent to need criticism. The most superficial reading of

the standard books on anthropology would show her abundant parallels from all parts of the world.

The body is the prison of the soul [p. 31], . . . the notions of *δσιότης* and purification and the abstinence from the flesh of animals enjoined by Orphic doctrine are all essentially Indian customs and foreign to Hellenic practice [p. 32]. . . . Also we see clearly that in India as in Greece, side by side with the practice of liturgies and sacrifices, we have the consciousness that there is something higher in religion than material acts of worship [p. 33]. . . . Now mysticism is exactly what we should expect to find as a result of Oriental influence [p. 59]. . . . Now this is just one of those passages where Plato might equally well be supposed to allude to the teaching of some Ionian lecturer who had imbibed the doctrines of the Upanishads [p. 61]. . . . In conclusion, the idea of the power of Necessity is intensely Oriental [p. 63]. . . . While the idleness which Aristophanes denounces might be taken as identical with the abstention from activity recommended in the philosophy of the Upanishads [p. 101]. . . . We have, indeed, seen that a tendency to asceticism and the practice of purificatory rites is a mark of Oriental influence in the teaching of the Orphics [p. 187]. . . . We have in ancient India a parallel to the notion of *δμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ* in the Dionysiac omophagy [p. 214].

Doubtless there were in the Orphic mysteries and in the local cults survivals of primitive animism and magic which were not countenanced by Attic rationalism.

The hazy generalities on which Miss Davis bases her arguments and her lack of precision are best exemplified by her etymologies. Her whole conception of Brahman (p. 34) is erroneous. See Griswold, *Brahman. Dhuni* (pp. 144, 185), a word of very doubtful etymology and meaning, is applied once to Soma. How is it possible to base Bacchus Thyoneus on a single occurrence of a common modifying adjective which is not even characteristic of Soma? *Nārās*, so far as we know (but see Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXXIII, 57), is not an old word for water. This meaning, which occurs first in Manu and the Epic, was probably invented to explain the old, obscure cult-name *Nārāyaṇa*. Miss Davis argues that, even though there was not in Greek or Sanskrit such a word meaning water, "the same idea which caused the early Hindu to speak of the waters as the offspring of Nara was transmitted to Greece, and caused the Hellene to apply the name Nereus to his own Sea-god." Such reasoning is preposterous. What authority is there for "good sacrifice" as the original meaning of *svāhā* (p. 156) or why are the words *εὖοι* and *svāhā* "manifestly closely connected philologically"? Why are *Meros* and *Meru* "evidently" connected (p. 166)? For *Meru*, see Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXX,

366 ff. There is not a particle of evidence to prove a confusion of *uru* and *ūru* (p. 167). The connection of *εραφιῶτα* with *rṣabha* is more than doubtful. No conclusions should be based on the etymology (pp. 175-76). *Indu* is derived from *und* (p. 146), but on p. 201 Miss Davis discards an etymology of Dionysis because a *υ* of Greek does not represent an *i* of Sanskrit. Is not Sanskrit *i* different from Sanskrit *u*? What authority is there for connecting Typhos with *dhūma* (p. 110)? Miss Davis misunderstands the signification of *b* versus *v* in Sanskrit and the dialects (p. 181). See Wackernagel, I, 161-63. The word is Kubera, not Kuvera, as Miss Davis regularly spells it. There is no trace of such a confusion in *açva*. *Açvala* occurs just once as the name of a priest in the Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa. *Vājin* (p. 183) does not mean "winged" or "swift." A laudable self-control leads Miss Davis to consider the name Dionysos as an unsolved problem (p. 201). And yet see the nonsensical note below. A personification of the Doors of the sacrificial place occurs in the obscure *āpri* hymns (see 1, 13, 6). A reference to Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, would show how common a personification of things pertaining to the sacrifice is. Because of this ritualistic metaphor she is led to consider Dithyrambus as the Lord of the Divine Doors and Dionysos as the Child of the Divine Doors. This is myth made from ritual with a vengeance. Contradicting this we find that Miss Davis on p. 190 approves Maury in finding an analogy between *dvijanman* and Dithyrambus and Dimeter. *Dvijanman* however is not "frequently" applied to Soma in the Rig Veda. There is not a single example of such use. The application to Soma in the passage from the Sāma Veda is of no consequence. A double birth is characteristic of other gods as well. The fawnskin of Dionysos is derived from the epithet *mṛgapiṭhu* (p. 203). The word is found only in a late lexicon. I can find no such word as *tītāna* in Sanskrit (p. 217). Miss Davis seems to agree with Langlois in deriving Sabazios from *sabhājya*, a word which is first found in the Epic. Miss Davis continues (p. 221), "In any case the word has a manifestly Iranian appearance and might easily have been derived from contact with Persia." Characteristic is her treatment of the name Orpheus (p. 252). After mentioning the proposed derivation from *rbhu* which, "needless to say, commands the approval of Oriental scholars," she continues, "But it is better, perhaps, to regard the name Orpheus as akin to *ὄρφνη*." In order to carry out her conceptions of the chthonian nature of Orpheus she abandons what is to her an unimpeachable etymology. Does such a proceeding increase our confidence in her other "approved" etymologies?

There is in the Vedānta a very close parallel to the theory of Ideas (p. 55). A reference to Rhys David's *Buddhist India* would show that in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. the Brahmins were by no means rulers and the Ksatriyas auxiliaries (p. 55).

Brahman is not the eleven-gated city of the soul (p. 62). There is no reference to a Heavenly City. The figure is a very concrete one and refers to the body (and its openings) in which the soul dwells.

The chapter on Asianism in Greek art and music (pp. 84-94) proves nothing. We know nothing of Indian art until the third century B.C., or of classical Indian music until the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata (ca. fourth century A.D.?). Strangways, *Music of Hindustan*, with good bibliography, appeared too late perhaps to be used; but there is no excuse for ignorance of all the articles which treat of the development of Sanskrit meter. There are no Sanskrit meters coeval with Aeschylus which admit of comparison with the Greek dithyramb (p. 99).

On p. 115 Miss Davis draws a comparison between the use of different dialects by Timotheos and the mingling of Sanskrit and Prākṛit in the Hindu drama. Our earliest plays, the recently discovered works of Bhāsa, are to be placed shortly before Kālidāsa (ca. 400 A.D.). There are no valid parallels for the time of Timotheos or for many centuries later.

Yaksha (pp. 161-63) is not derived from *yaj* and does not mean "a being honoured by sacrifice." The resemblance to *ἱακχος* does not prove that the two words are the same. *Bhaksha*, "food, drink," is never a proper name and is useless in proving any analogy between *ἱακχος* and *Yakshas*. There is no evidence to show that Soma developed into Kubera. See Hopkins, *JAOS*, XXX, 55 ff. The Kubera of the later Veda is a very different figure from the Kubera of the Epic. The *Yaksha* of the Veda is very different from the *Yaksha* of the Epic. There is no possibility that the word was originally applied to the guardians of Kubera's treasure. That is a much later development. Bacchus is derived (p. 162) not from the Vedic Bhaga but from the Avestan Bagha (who has none of the particular traits of the Vedic Bhaga and is Indo-European for "god"), "inasmuch as it was primarily through Persia that Greece came in contact with Aryan ideas or culture" (cf. p. 200: "among their Iranian brethren, from whom it is natural to suppose the Greeks would have heard the words rather than from the Indians"). And yet our author bases a large number of the cult-names of Dionysos directly on Vedic words without adducing any Avestan parallels. Does she assume here, as she must do to be logical, intermediate Avestan

forms? If these Vedic words were likewise heard from the Iranians it would be necessary to assume that there was an older Persian cult, corresponding exactly to the Vedic one, which has vanished without leaving any trace in our Avesta. Further, Miss Davis contradicts herself (p. 162) in trying to make the words philologically identical; but the *gh* of the Avestan word is not "Aryan," since the Vedic form has *g*. Either Bacchus was "derived" from Persia (in which case there is no need to prove exact philological identity) or it is an Indo-European cognate (in which case she needs evidence for the equation of *g* with κχ). Test her logic in any way you please and it collapses like a house of cards.

Rākshasa is not derived from *raks*, "to protect." There is no evidence to connect the Rākshasas with the Gandharvas "as a more malignant variety" (p. 180).

On pp. 162 and 298, note, an effort is made to prove that the torch-light festival of Iakchos was borrowed from the Indian *dīpālī* festival. The words *dīpālī* and *yaksharātri* are found only in late lexicons. On p. 243 Miss Davis notes a similar festival in Egypt and says with sangfroid that it may be difficult to say whether the torches at the Eleusinia "are derived from Egypt or from farther East."

There is no evidence to show that in Hanuman and his monkey followers "we probably have representations of the more propitious character of the Centaurs" (p. 181).

Miss Davis (p. 216) bases Dionysos Isodaites on the passage Rig Veda, 9, 74, 5. *Pinvati* does not mean "delivers" but "fills, swells." *Manuṣe* probably means "for mankind." *Tvacam* is not "body" but "leather bag," used metaphorically for "cloud."

Nāsadiya, p. 27, should be *Nāsadiya*. *Namarūpa*, p. 38, should be *Nāmarūpa*. *Sabrāmanmān*, p. 86, should be *Subrahmanya*. *Mathūra*, p. 160, should be *Mathurā*. *Bhanu*, p. 194, note, should be *bhānu*. There are many errors in the transliteration of passages from the Sanskrit.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CHURCH

Since the appearance, fifteen years ago, of Wernle's *Anfänge unserer Religion*, much earnest study has been devoted to the numerous problems associated with the development of early Christianity. Until recently,